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Increasing current Individual Retirement Account (IRA) limits would lead
to substantial increases in tax-deferred savingaccording to evidence in the
paper, based on the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances. For example, therecent
Treasury Plan would increase IRA Contributions by about 30percent. The
primary focus of the paper, however, is the effect of limit increaseson other
saving. How much of the IRA increase would be offset by reduction in
non-tax-deferred saving? The weight of the evidencesuggests that very little
of the increase would be offset by reduction in other financialassets,
possibly 10 to 20 percent. The estimates suggest that 45 to 55percent of the
IRA increase would be funded by reduction inexpenditure for other goods and
services, and about 35 percent by reduced taxes. The analysisrests on a
savings decision structure recognizing the constraint that the IRA limit
places on the allocation of current income; it is a constrainedoptimization
model with the IRA limit the principle constraint. The evidencealso suggests
substantial variation in saving behavior amongsegments of the population. In
addition, it appears that IRAs do not serve as a substitute forprivate
pension plans. Thus the legislative goal of disproportionatelyincreasing
retirement saving among persons without pension plans isapparently not being
realized. But the more general goal of increasinggeneral saving is.
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Individual retirement accounts (IRAs) wereestablished in 1974 as
part of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act toencourage employees
not covered by private pension plans tosave for retirement. The Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 extended the availability ofIRAs to all employees
and raised the contribution limit. Thelegislation emphasized the need to
enhance the economic well-being of futureretirees and the need to increase
national saving. Now any employee withearnings above $2000 can contribute
$2000 to an IRA account each year. Anemployed person and a non-working
spouse C8fl contribute a total of $2250, while a marriedcouple who are both
working can contribute $2000 each. Current taxproposals contemplate
substantial increases in the limits. The taxon the principal and interest
is deferred until money iswithdrawnfrom the account. There is a penalty
for withdrawal before age 59i, which isapparently intended to discourage
the use of IRAs for non-retirementsaving.
To determine whether IRA accounts serveas a substitute for private
pension plans, it is important to know who contributesto IRAs. Whether
they are an important form of saving for retirementdepends on how much is
contributed. In addition, the short-run tax cost ofIRAs depends on their
prevalence. These questions have been addressedby Venti and Wise [1985a]
for the United States and by Wise (1984,1985] for Canada. The central
focus of this paper is the relationship betweenIRA contributions and other-2-
forms of saving. What is the net effect of IRA accounts on -individual
saving? In addressing this question, estimates of desired IRA contributions
are also obtained, and these estimates can be compared with results based on
other data sources.
Ideal data to answer this question would provide information on
changes in all forms of assets over time. One could then compare annual IRA
contributions with increases or decreases in other forms of saving.
The set of questions that can be addressed directly with available data is
limited, however. IRAs were only open to most employees beginning in 1982
and currently available data pertain only to that year. In addition, only
limited information -is available on changes in other asset holdings in 1982.
Given the data limitations, the goal of the analysis presented in this paper
is to estimate the effect that changes in the IRA contribution limit would
have on other forms of saving, as well as on IRA contributions themselves.
As explained below, other forms of saving probably are best thought of as
liquid assets.
There are two central questions that arise -in considering the
effect of newly available IRAs on net saving: the first is the extent to
which IRA contributions are made by withdrawing funds from other existing
balances, and thus explicitly substituting one form of saving for another.
Presumably such substitution would be made by taking funds from existing
liquid asset balances, like other savings accounts. It is unlikely that in
the short run, IRA contributions would be made by reducing non-liquid asset
balances like housing. A related question, although possibly more subtle
and difficult to answer empirically, is whether new saving would have been—3-
placed in other accounts were it not for the availability of IRAs,
independent of existing balances.
Another question is the extent to which IRA contributionsmay
ultimately serve as a substitute for non-liquid assets.In the long run
individuals may contribute to IRAs instead of investing inhousing, for
example. This question is more difficult to address empirically, andno
attempt is made to answer it here. Whether IRA contributions were
substituted for other liquid assets in 1982 is the question thatcan be most
directly addressed using the available data. But we believe that the
estimates may also provide a reasonable indication of the trade-offbetween
IRA contributions and liquid assets in the long run as well. Thespirit of
the paper is to distinguish direct evidence about which the resultsare
likely to be relatively robust from questions about which the evidence is
only indirect. An attempt is made to draw inferences based on theweight of
the evidence. In short, given the available data and theirlimitations,
what can be said about the effect of IRAs on net individualsaving?
Background data on IRA contributions and other wealth holdings are
presented in section I. The model used for estimation is developed in section
II. Its key feature is constrained optimization, with the limiton IRA
contributions the primary constraint. The principle goal is to obtain
estimates of the effect of changes in IRA limits on othersaving, as well as
on IRA contributions themselves. The model addresses the allocation of
current income. This approach has been chosen over a model of presumed
lifetime saving behavior, although the allocation of current income couldbe
thought of as the reduced form of a life cycle model. In addition, estimates-4-
ofthe allocation of current income based on age and other personal attributes
allow inferences about life cycle saving behavior.
The results are presented in section III. The emphasis is on the
sensitivity of the results to model specification and to the interpretation
of a key variable, "savings and reserve funds.1' The most important results
are presented in the form of simulations of the effect of proposed limit
changes on IRA contributions and other saving. Some of the results
developed here can be compared with evidence based on other data sources.
Comparable evidence on IRA contributions for 1982 has been developed by
Venti and Wise (1985], based on Current Population Survey data. The results
of this paper are based on the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which
presents information on IRAs in 1982. Section IV presents a summary of the
findings and concluding discussion.
1. Descriptive Statistics
About 16 percent of wage earner families have IRA accounts, as
shown in table 1.1 Almost no families with incomes under $10,000 have them
and only about 7 percent of families with incomes between $10,000 and
$20,000. Somewhat more than half of those with incomes greater than $50,000
contribute to IRAs.2 The distribution of all contributors by income interval
is as follows:
1Self-employed persons have been excluded from the analysis.
2Numbers based on CPS data (Venti and Wise (1985]) indicate a higher
proportion of wage earners with IRAs. While the CPS data are weighted to
represent the employed population, the SCF data reported here are weighted
to represent families with a wage earner.—5—








Older persons are considerably more likely thanyounger ones to
contribute, although the proportion drops at age 65 when alarge proportion of
employees retire. For example, among families in the $20,000 to$30,000
income interval, 36 percent of those 55 to 64 contributedbut only 11 percent
of those aged 25 to 34.
The subsequent analysis will rely in part onresponses to a
question that asketh "Considering all of your savings andreserve funds,
overall, did you put more money in or take moremoney out in 1982V'3 The
precise interpretation that should be assigned theresponses is unclear. In
particular, it is not clear whether savings and reserve funds includeor
exclude IRA Contributions. The analysis is conducted andthe results are
evaluated using both interpretations, although we believe itis most
plausible to assume that IRAs are excluded. Wepresume that responses do
not reflect non-liquid assets like housing. Theproportion of families
3mree responses were possible: (1) Putmore money in. (2) Stayed the
same.(3) Took more money out.-6-
Table1. Proportion of families with IRA accounts,










54 55-64 65+ All
0 -10 .01 .00 .03 .01 .04 .01 .01
10 —20 .04 .04 .04 .09 .20 .04 .07
20 —30 .05 .11 .10 .21 .36 .06 .14
30 -40 .15 .25 .14 .34 .43 .19 .25
40 —50 .00 .21 .41 .42 .38 .31 .34
50 -100 .00 .33 .51 .53 .75 .36 .51
100+ .49 .66 .79 .65 .58 .65
All .03 .12 .19 .26 .30 .06 .16
a. The data are weighted to be representative of all families.
The total sample size for this table is 3205.—7—
Table 2. Proportion of families with increase in
"savings and reserve funds," by income and age a
Income
Interval
($1000's) < 25 25 -3435 —
Age Interval
4445 -5455 -64 65+ All
0 —10 .10 .15 .13 .05 .10 .20 .14
10 —20 .33 .23 .19 .12 .32 .35 .26
20 —30 .35 .37 .26 .21 .47 .56 .35
30 -40 .31 .46 .40 .47 .41 .58 .44
40 -50 .75 .47 .42 .56 .41 .75 .50
50 -100 .00 .48 .56 .54 .57 .71 .56
100+ .58 .53 .47 .54 .65 .54
All .26 .32 .32 .30 .35 .33 .32
a. The data are weighted to be representative of all families.
The total sample size for this table is 3208.-8-
indicatingan -increase in "savings and reserve funds" is shown in table 2.
Only 32 percent of respondents indicated an increase in 1982, while the
remainder indicated a decrease or no change.4 The proportion indicating an
increase rises markedly with income, but shows little relationship to age.
A key consideration in our analysis is the relationship between IRA
contributions and the change in "savings and reserve funds". Suppose IRA
contributions were typically taken from "savings and reserve funds" balances.
If savings and reserve funds include IRAs, there would be no change in overall
savings and reserve funds. If the latter were interpreted to exclude IRAs,
contributions to IRAs should be associated with a decline in savings and
reserve funds. Apparently neither is true. Persons who contribute to IRAs
are much more likely to indicate an increase than those who don't. The ratio
of the proportion of IRA contributors with an increase in "savings and reserve
funds" to the proportion of noncontributors with an increase is shown in table
3, by income and age. Overall, contributors are more than twice as likely as
noncontributors to indicate an increase, although this number reflects in part
different distributions of contributors and noncontributors by income and age.
The average of the cell ratios -is 1.77.
Thus these numbers suggest that there are savers and non—savers and
that savers save both through IRAs and through other forms; the positive
relationship reflects an individual-specific effect. The subsequent analysis
4mis evidence -is consistent with the widespread perception that individual
savings rates in the United States have been unusually low in recent years and
that consumer debt has been increasing, See, for example, the New York Times,
October 29, 1985; the Boston Globe, September 15 and November 22, 1985.-9-
Table 3. Proportion of IRA contributorswith increase in "savings and
reserve funds," -proportionof non—contributors with increase in
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provides support for an individual-specific savings effect, while also
suggesting a substantial positive effect of IRAs on net individual saving.
To put IRA contributions in perspective and to help to interpret
the analysis below, it is useful to have in mind the magnitude of individual
wealth holdings. The median wealth of persons in the sample is $22,900,
excluding pensions and Social Security wealth.5 Even among persons 55 to
64, the median is only $55,000 (see table 4). Most of this wealth is non-
liquid, the preponderance of which is housing. Consistent with other evi-
dence (e.g., 1-lurd and Shoven (1985], Bernheim [1984], Diamond and Hausman
[1984]), a large proportion of individuals have very little non-housing
wealth; they save very little. Median liquid assets, excluding stocks and
bonds, are shown in table 5, by income and age. The median for all families
is $1,200. For families earning $30,000 to $40,000 with a head 45 to 54
years it is only $4,600. While most people have some liquid assets, only
about 20 percent have financial assets in the form of stocks or bonds.6 Thus
it is clear that most people have not been accumulating financial assets at
a rate close to the $2000 per year that an IRA allows.
5me following breakdown of wealth is used throughout this paper:
Liquid Assets: checking accounts, certificates of deposit,
savings accounts, money market accounts, savings bonds
Other Financial Assets: stocks, bonds, trusts
IRAs and Keoghs: balances
Other Assets: value of home, other property and receivables
Debt: mortgage and consumer debt
Total wealth is the sum of the first four categories minus debt. Wealth
does not include the cash value of life insurance, the value of motor
vehicles, and pension and social security wealth.
6The median for all financial assets including stocks and bonds is 1.3, versus
1.2 when they are excluded. For more detail, see Venti and Wise (1985b].—11--
Table 4. Median of wealth,by income and age a
Income
Age Interval Interval
($1000's) <25 25 —3435 —4445 — 5455 - 64 65+ All
0 —10 .3 .0 .1 .1 1.5 io.o .5
10—20 .8 2.0 10.3 30.0 40.9 65.8 10.0
20 —30 2.5 13.8 31.6 44.6 90.2 125.5 28.3
30 -40 15.4 34.3 47.3 71.4 77.8 269.7 50.5
40 -50 10.9 40.3 74.6 90.5 114.4 219.0 80.6
50 —100 33.2 85.5 101.1 122.7 196.6 220.5 123.6
100+ —— 124.8 182.9 317.1 334.51308.7 279.0
All 0.6 5.9 35.6 47.1 55.0 40.1 22.9
a. In $l000s. The dataare weighted to be representativeof all
families. The total sample sizefor this table is 2249.-12-
Table 5. Median of liquid assets, by income and age a
Income
Interval
($1000's) < 25 25 —3435 —
Age Interval
4445 —5455 -64 65+ All
0 -10 .2 .0 .0 .0 .0 .5 .1
10 —20 .4 .3 .5 .9 3.5 16.2 .7
20 -30 .6 1.2 1.6 1.9 4.9 46.8 1.7
30 40 1.0 2.9 2.4 4.6 3.6 107.0 3.5
40 -50 2.0 2.8 4.7 5.6 12.8 36.5 5.5
50 —100 16.4 5.7 13.8 8.7 22.1 37.8 12.8
100+ 12.8 12.5 42.7 74.2 124.0 30.4
All .4 .8 1.7 1.9 3.0 4.0 1.2
a. In $1000s. Stocks and bonds are excluded. The data are
weighted to be representative of all families. The total sample
size for this table is 2729.-13-
Table 6. Median wealth of IRA contributors ÷ median wealth of non-IRA
a contributors, by income and age
Income
Interval
($1000's) <25 25 -34
Age Interval
35 -4445 —5455 -64 65+ All
0 —10 -- -- -- -- -- -- ——
10 —20 —- 6.05 -— —- 1.95 —- 7.03
20 —30 —— 1.81 1.61 1.18 1.23 -— 2.15
30 —40 —— 1.55 1.74 1.14 1.11 —— 1.67
40 —50 -— 1.58 1.77 1.62 .73 -— 1.86
50 —100 —— 1.66 1.17 1.03 1.03 —- 1.25
100+ —- -- —- -- .25 —— 2.71
All -- 7.30 3.19 1.87 2.08 3.46 5.26
a. Not reported for cells in which there were fewer than 8 IRA
contributors.-14-
The median wealth of IRA contributors divided by the median wealth
of noncoritributors, by income and age, is shown in table 6. Contributors
have substantially higher wealth on average. The average of the cell
ratios is 1.5O. The analysis below, however, indicates that after
controlling for other variables, total wealth is in fact negatively related to
IRA contributions. The results, including detail by liquid versus non-liquid
wealth, suggest that the numbers in table 6 also reflect individual-specific
saving effects; some people are savers, others are not.
In summary: the descriptive data confirm that low income persons
are unlikely to contribute to IRAs. But they provide no direct evidence that
IRA contributions are offset by reductions in other forms of saving; persons
who contribute to IRAs are more likely than those who do not to indicate an
overall increase in savings and reserve funds. The descriptive data, however,
do not reveal whether savers save more because of the IRA option. The
subsequent analysis is intended to shed light on this issue.
II. Allocation of Income: Individual Saving and IRA Constraints
Given the limitations of the data, the goal is to develop a
statistical model that will allow inferences based on the information that
is available. The approach is to consider the allocation of current income
in the spirit of expenditure studies, but with concentration on what is not
spent for current consumption. The key feature of the approach is to
incorporate the limit on tax-deferred saving in the estimation procedure
7weighted by the number of IRA contributors.—15—
and then to infer from the parameter estimates how savings behaviorwould
change if the limit were changed. To assure that estimated constrained and
unconstrained behavior are internally consistent, the functional forms ofthe
estimated equations are related through an underlying decision function.The
model is intended to be "structural" with respect to changes -in theIRA limit,
although as explained below, not necessarily with respect to the individual
variables that are used to estimate choice parameters of individuals.We
begin with a simple example and then present the specifications used for
estimation. For expository purposes, we also discuss first aspecification
that implies only a limited form of substitution between IRA and othersaving.
We then present a model that allows more flexible substitution and that
incorporates the first as a special case.
A. A Simple Example
Suppose that current income Y can be allocated to tax-deferred IRA
saving S, to other forms of saving S2. or to current uses, Y -
S1
-S.
Assume also that were there no limit onS1, or if persons were not constrained




For estimation, we need also to consider saving functions that are consistent
with these, but for persons who are constrained by the limit onS1. These may
be obtained by considering an underlying decision function that is consistent
with observed saving decisions.






where b1 and b2 are parameters. Maximization of (2) with respect to S and
2 yields (1). The presumption is that the b's depend on measured personal
attributes like age, income, wealth, education, marital status; unmeasured
attributes that affect saving behavior in general; and unmeasured attributes
like expected future liquidity needs or attitude toward risk that may affect
the preferred allocation of income to S1, versus S2. This specification
treats IRAs and other forms of saving as different "goods," thus emphasizing
non—price differences between the two forms of saving. In particular, because
of the early withdrawal penalty that makes IRA5 less liquid than other saving,
they may tend to be more narrowly targeted to retirement consumption; much of
saving in other forms may be for different and more short term purposes. The
"price" difference between the two forms of saving is brought out below.










1 (V—L)if b1Y ? L
1
The relationship between income and S2 saving depends on whether the limit
on the tax-deferred S1 saving has been reached. In the subsequent discussion,-17—
weshall begin with a decision function, but it should be understood thatit
is chosen to be consistent with observed saving decisions. It isa construct
that assures that constrained and unconstrained savings functionsare
consistent with each other.
It will be important to estimate the change inS2 with a change in
the limit L. In this case dS2/dL =-b2/(1-b1),depending only on the b's.
Thus to obtain good estimates of the effect of limit changes, it isnecessary
only to have good estimates of these parameters; not necessarily of the effect
on the b's of the variables that will be used to estimate them. Figure 1
describes graphically the relationship between income andS1 and 2' with
particular reference to the estimated specification described in section B
below.
B. The Estimated Model: A Special Case
In practice, S2 could be negative. "Desired"S1 could also be
negative, although not its observed value. Previous work by Venti and Wise
[1985a) and by Wise [1985] indicates that IRA contributions alone can be
described well by a Tobit specification with limits at zero and L.8 In
addition, the cost of one dollar of S1 in terms of current consumption is
(1 -t),where t is the marginal tax rate, whereas the cost ofS2 is 1.
A decision function and implicit budget constraint that incorporates
these characteristics is
1-b2-b2 b
b2 (4) V[Y —T—
S1(1
—t)—
S2] [S —a1]'[S2 —a2]
8For most purposes it is notnecessary to specify two behavioral equations:














































































































































































































































































The presumption is that if bothS1 and S2 were zero, current consumption
would be V -1,where I is total taxes. This amount servesas the base
9 case. If IRA contributions S1 are made, taxes are reduced
by tS1. In
practice, t1current consumption" includes some forms ofsaving like housing
since the variable used to describeS2 does not reflect all forms of non-IRA
saving.
10
Consistent with (4), the "desired" level of tax-deferredsaving















L L if L c
S1




a2] if S1 <0








a2] if S1 L
Stylized versions of the S1 and S2 functions are graphed infigure 1, where
(V —T)*is the after—tax income level at which the limit Lon S1 is
91n practice themarginal tax rate -is not constant, but incorporating this
non-linearity into the budget constraint would greatly increase thecomplexity of the analysis and we believe would notappreciably affect the results, given
the small potential IRA contributions relative to income.
10While we use the decisionfunction simply to provide consistent functional-20-
reached.
For expositional purposes, an advantage of the specification
described above is that a closed form solution to the constrained saving
function can be obtained from the decision function. This is not always the
case. Indeed, as shown below, it is not true with the more general
specification described in section C below.11 General discussions of demand
with "rationing are presented in Deaton and Muellbauer 11981] and in Deaton
[1981], with the discussion often in terms of indirect utility or expenditure
functions. Oeaton shows that closed form solutions to constrained demand
functions can be obtained in some cases even when the utility function is not
separable, the property that assures a closed form solution in the
specification above.





where X is a vector of individual characteristics and the B's are vectors of
parameters to be estimated. The unit normal distribution function
forms for the constrained and unconstrained S2 functions, there is some
precedent for including asset (saving) balances in a true utility function.
See for example Sidrauski [1967), Fischer [1979], Calvo [1979], Obstfeld
[1984, 1985], and Poterba and Rotemberg [1986]. With a1 and a2 random, as
described below, annual S1 and S2 flows could be thought of as proxies for
balances.
11A similar situation characterizes the specification used by Hausman and Ruud
[1984], for example, to describe family labor supply. Their specification
yields unconstrained closed form solutions to the labor supply functions of
the husband and the wife, consistent with an indirect utility function. But
constrained functions analogous to ours are only defined implicitly.-21-
constrains b1 and b2 to be between 0 and 1.12
To allow for random preferences for savingamong individuals,
presumably reflecting unmeasured individual attributes, theparameters




Large values of a1 and a2 indicate high desiredS1 and S2 respectively; large
a1 means lower desirpd S2 and large a2 lower desired S1.13
In additio ,analternative stochastic specification assumes that
a1 and a2 are non-stochastic, but simple additive disturbance terms are added
to the unconstrained S1 andS2 equations. Details of the stochastic structure
under both specifications are presented in Venti and Wise(1985b]. An
important parameter is the correlation between the disturbanceterms in S1 and
This correlation contributes to inference about theextent to which
observed saving behavior results from unmeasuredindividual—specific effects
or the extent to which saving in one form is offsetby saving in another.
The possible outcomes and associated probabilitystatements are
listed below, under the two interpretations of"savings and reserve funds",
XB
12Thus, for example,b1 =f1vdv,where v is a standard normal variable. In







denoted by S.If S includes IRAs, S =
S1
+S2;if it does not, S =S2.
Outcomes and Associated Probabilites
Outcome Probability:
If S=S1 If S=S2
=0,S >0 Pr[ S1 <0and S2 >01 Pr[S1 <0and S2 >0)
O<s
<L,S >0 Pr =s
and S2 >-s1] Pr[ S1 =S1 and >0]
= L,S >0 Pr[ >Land S2 >-L) Pr[S1 >Land S2 >01
= 0,S <0 Pr[ <0and S2 <0) Pr[ <0and <0]
O<s
<L,S <0 Pr( S1 =s
and S2 <-S1 ] Pr[S1 =s
and S2 <0]
= L,S <0 Pr[ S1 >Land S2 <-L] Pr(S1 >Land S2 <0]
Thelatter interpretation is we believe the most likely to reflect the
respondent's intent. Most of the discussion and reported simulations are
based on this assumption. Nonetheless, we shall present some estimates based
on the S =+ 2interpretation. This interpretation should provide the
most stable estimates.14 We show that estimates based on this interpretation
are rather insensitive to important assumptions. Estimates are obtained by
maximum likelihood.
Implicit in the functional form described above is an "independence"
assumption that restricts the implied substitution between and S2 on the
one hand and current consumption on the other. Consider the allocation of a
marginal dollar of current income before and after the limit on S1 has been
reached. The marginal shares allocated to S, 2' and consumption are:
l4io determine the magnitude of S2. not just its sign, it is necessary to
identify its residual variance. In many situations similar to this,
identification of both a2 and01 would not be possible given only qualitative-23—
Unconstrained'5 Constrained
S1 b1/(1 —t) 0











Thus the ratio of the marginal share that goes toS2 versus the share that
goes to consumption, b2/(1 -b1
-
b2),is independent of whether the limit
on S has been reached. One might expect, however, that this ratio would
increase after the limit is reached if there is greater substitution between
S1 and S2 than between either of these and consumption.
The importance of this property is what it implies about the effect
of an increase in the tax-deferred limit L on non-tax—deferred saving2•
Only persons at the limit will be affected by increasing it. For these
people, dS1/dL =1.The amount that is taken from non-tax-deferred saving
to fund the dollar increase in S1 is dS2/dL =-(1-t)b2/(1
-
b1),for those






b1).Thus the model implies a proportionate
reduction in 2 and C in accordance with the unconstrained shares. Therefore
results based on a functional form that allows more flexible substitution
information on S2. its sign. In this case, however, identification
is in principle provided by three features of the model: (1) the functional
form itself; (2) the limit L on S1; and (3) by direct information on the value
of S2 in addition to its sign, if "savings and reserve funds" is interpreted
to include IRAs. For more detail, see Venti and Wise [1985b].
15A dollar of current after-tax income allocated toS1 yields S1/(1 —t)in tax-
deferred saving.
16This effect can be seen from figure 1. The effect of changing the limit is to
shift downward the function described by the steeper sloped segment of
the S2 function and the dashed extension of it.-24--
betweenS1 and S2 are also obtained.
C. Relaxing the Independence Assumption
To relax the restrictive substitution implications of the spec-i—
fication above, suppose that preferred allocations of current income are in








where the left-hand term in brackets incorporates the budget constraint. The
cost of S in terms of current consumption is P1 and the cost of S2 is P2.
This function has a tree structure with one branch consumption and the other
saving. The two branches are combined in a Cobb-Douglas manner with parameter
.Thetwo forms of saving are combined in a C.E.S. subfunction to form the
saving branch. The parameter a indicates the relative "preference" for
S versus 2• If they were treated as equivalent, a would equal •517 The
elasticity of substitution between S1 and S2 is 1/(1 —k).18








with P1 =I-tand P2 =1.The unrestricted "desired" levels of S1 and S2
are given by
171n this case, with P1 =P2,desired S would equal desired S2, as can be seen
from equation (14) below.
18This specification is thus a slight variant of the "S-branch" utility tree of














The function (10) is the same as the preference function (4) above and
yields the same constrained savings functions as those in equations (5) and
(6), but with b1 =aand b2 =(1—a).
Because the parameters a and $haveinformative interpretations, we
shall estimate them as functions of X, as an alternative to estimation of
b1 and b2. Although if b1, b2, a, andwere the same for all persons in
the sample --notfunctions of attributes X --theequalities would hold,
they will not necessarily hold when each is estimated as a function of X.
For example, the mean over X ofb1 =[XB1]will not equal the mean over X




whereA and B are vectors of parameters to be estimated.
With this parameterization, it is convenient to think ofas the
marginal after-tax dollar devoted to saving (S1 and and a as the
proportion of a saved dollar devoted to S1. Define =a/(1-t).It is the
amount of tax-deferred S1 obtained for the proportion a, and
=1-)'i(l
-t)=1-ais the proportion devoted to non-tax-deferred S2.19
If k 40,it is informative first to describe the savings functions in
'9The a,parameterization essentially allows interactions between the X
variables and thus the difference in the two parameterizations is more than





parameterizing b1 and b2 would yield results the same as the section B-26-
terms of both P1 and P2. In this case, the unconstrained desired levels of
S1 and S2 are given by







Fromthe constraint y1P1 +22









With P2= 1 and 1 —






If k =0,this expression reduces to ct/P1=a/(1-t)as in equation (11).
If the S1 constraint -isbindingso that S =L,S2 is defined only











obtained by maximizing (9) with respect to S, with S1 =L.This function must
be evaluated at each iteration of the maximum likelihood estimation routine.
specification.-27-
Wehave not attempted to do this with randoma1 and a2. Only the additive
disturbance specification has been used in thiscase. Estimates based on
the restricted specification described in sectionB, however, lead us to




The estimates are based on the 1983Survey of Consumer Finances.
The Survey provides detailed informationon asset balances of all kinds, as
well as on income and other personal attributes.From data on IRA balances
it is possible to infer 1982 contributions,as explained in appendix A.
Unfortunately the data do not include changes in other assetbalances in
1982, as emphasized above. The absence of this data hasled us to con-
centrate on information contained in the change in"savings and reserve
funds" question.
Estimation is based on 1068 observations. Familieswere deleted
from the original sample if they wereineligible for an IRA (self—employed
or not working). Nonresponse reduced the sample further.The data most
often missing were self—reported marginal taxrates and the series of
responses required to calculate housing equity. The variablemeans in the
estimation sample (Appendix Table 1) arevery close to the means for all of
20Similar evidence for the k =0case is presented in Venti and Wise [1985bj,
but with a and ,insteadof b1 and b2, parameterjzed.-28-
those surveyed, however.21 Estimates based on a larger sample using predicted
marginal tax rates are not appreciably different from those reported below
based on self-reported rates.
B. Parameter Estimates
As emphasized above, the main concern is to obtain "reliable"
estimates of b1 and b2 (or of a and ); they are the principle determinants of
the effect of a change in L on IRA and non-IRA saving. While the effect of
the variables X on the b's is of interest, it is not necessary to obtain
unbiased estimates of these effects to estimate the effect of changing L. The
model is intended to be structural with respect to L, not necessarily with
respect to the effects of the variables X that determine the b's.22 Given the
limit L, the parameters a1 and a2, and the parameters b1 and b2, S1 and
S2 savings are given by the functions like those graphed in figure 1. Their
amounts may be calculated given after-tax income, Y-T. If the limit is
increased by AL, the constrained S2 function is shifted downward by
AL, using equation (6), and its intersection (the kink
point in figure 1) with the unconstrained function is shifted outward. Given
the new limit, new S1 and S2 values may be calculated. The effect of changing
the limit depends only on b1 and b2. Thus in reporting the results we
21For example, mean wealth in the estimation sample is $59,781 and it is $59,090
in the total sample, mean age is 37.7 versus 39.4, mean education is 13.4
versus 12.2, and the mean self—reported marginal tax rate is 0.25 versus 0.27.
22Using the regression analogy, it is equivalent to obtaining an unbiased
estimate of E(Y JX),where V =Xb+c,rather than unbiased estimates of each
component of b.-29-
emphasize the sensitivity of the estimated values of b1 and b2 to model
specification. To simulate the average effect of a limit change, random
values of a1 and a2 are selected from a bivariate normal distribution using
the estimated means and covariance terms. (The alternative specification
assumes additive disturbances on the S1 and S2 equations, also with a
bivariate normal distribution.)23
We begin with estimates based on the limited substitution model
with b1 and b2 parameterized (equations 5 and 6). Based on this specification
we shall first consider a base case with S =S.We then discuss variants of






S2should in principle be the most stable. We show in
particular that the estimated values of 01 and 02 are very close and that the
hypothesis that a =2cannot be rejected. This is a potentially important
restriction that has been imposed under the assumption that S =S2.
These latter estimates may be compared with those obtained with k=O
but with a and ,insteadof b1 and b2, parameterized. To provide a summary
measure that allows comparison across the specifications, we present








where the equalities hold only if b1 and b2, a andare not parameterized.
Finally, estimates with k set at .65 are presented. In practice,
23A potentially important assumption is the presumed distribution of the random
terms. The results below show that the model fits the observed data well by
income interval and this provides some support for the distributional-30-
widely varying values of k cannot be distinguished by the data.24 Within—
sample predictions are essentially the same.Nonetheless the predicted
effects of limit changes do depend on the assumed substitution behavior
under which the data were generated. Thus we set k at a rather high level
and obtain estimates for the other parameters. Indications of model fit,
simulation results, and the sensitivity of the simulations to model
specification follow.
1. Limited Substitution, b1 and b2 Parameterized
a. The Base Specification
Parameter estimates obtained under the assumption that S =S2are
shown in Table 7. The correlation between the random preference parameters
a1 and a2 is .47 (with a standard of error of .06). The implied correlation
between the S and S2 disturbance terms is .16, evaluated at the mean of the
data. Although the correlation is small, it is consistent with an individual-
specific savings effect (presumably due to unmeasured individual attributes)
that affects both IRA and other saving in the same direction. It does not
provide support for the possibility that persons who save more in one form
assumptions. A better test would be to use the model to predict the effect of
a limit change. While this is not possible for the United States, such
predictions have been made for Canadian tax-deferred saving contributions
using a specification similar to the one used here for IRA contributions. The
model estimated using data from one year predicted very accurately the
contributions in a later year with a 60 percent lower contribution limit, and
vice—versa. See Wise [1984, 1985]. The results are also summarized in Venti
and Wise {1985a].
24Similar findings are reported by Mundlak [1975] and by Gr-iliches and Ringstad
[1971] with respect to production data. In our case, the likelihood function
is very flat around k =0.-31—
Table 7. Parameter estimates with b1 and b2 parameterized and S =S2.






Correlation of a1, a2
S.D. of S (at mean)
S.D. of S2 (at mean)
Correlation of S1, S2























































































tend to save less -in the other. This substitution hypothesis would be
consistent with a negative correlation.
The estimated coefficients on the wealth variables also seem con—
sistent with an individual-specific savings effect. Liquid assets, which are
likely to be the most readily transferred to IRA accounts are positively
related to IRAs, but they are also positively related to other saving. Indeed
the relationship to the S2 saving is much greater than the relationship to
IRAs. A $1,000 increase in liquid assets is associated with a $45 increase
in S2. but only a $5 increase in S1. Parameterization -in terms of a and
shows a positive relationship of liquid assets to total saving in the two
forms but a negative relationship to the proportion of the total devoted to
IRAs, as shown in table 8 below. Non-liquid assets are negatively related to
both S1 and 2 saving. Parameterization of a andshows that non—liquid
wealth is negatively related to total saving -in these forms, but is positively
related to the proportion devoted to IRAs. (As shown -in appendix table 4,
total wealth is negatively related to total saving in the S1 and S2 forms, and
is unrelated to the allocation to S1 versus S2.) Thus this evidence also
seems to support individual-specific saving preferences; some persons are
savers and others not, some save -in liquid and others in less liquid forms.
But the evidence does not provide much support for the possibility that IRA
funds were typically withdrawn from other liquid asset balances.25
It is important to keep in mind that in this specification, cumulated
assets serve as a measure of individual—specific savings effects. They are
25t is not possible to reach strong conclusions based on this evidence because
the asset balances are reported after an IRA contribution and because it is
not clear what the relationship should be if liquid assets, say, are larger
than the IRA limit. But if liquid assets were relatively large at the end of
the period one might suppose that they were large when the IRA decision was—33-
not intended to serve as exogenous determinants of the b's; in thissense they
would be endogenous. But their relationship to the b's alsoprovides us with
information about the hypothesis that IRA contributionsare simply taken from
other saving balances.
The mean estimated b1 andb2 parameters, .174 and .102 respectively,
also suggest a strong preference for IRA versus othersaving. At the margin,
17 cents of an additional dollar of after—tax income wouldgo to IRAs ——
yieldingabout 25 cents in IRA saving --andabout 10 cents would go to
S2 saving.
It is tempting to explain the difference betweenb1 and b2 by the
difference in the return to tax—deferred versus non-tax-deferredsaving. The
revealed preference for IRAs -is distinct from the lowerprice of tax-deferred
saving in terms of current consumption, which through the currentyear budget
constraint of our model serves to increase the amount of IRAsaving, given
b1 and b2. For example, suppose that r is the interest rate, t' is the
marginal tax rate during the time that funds are in an IRA account, t is the
rate when funds are withdrawn, and the contribution -is made atage j' and
withdrawn at age j. A dollar invested in an IRA yields
1'(l -t)ej
-'•[i-p(j)J,where p(j) is a penalty for early withdrawal.
The penalty is 0 if j >59iand .1 if j <59.A dollar of non-tax-deferred
saving yields (1 -t')e'11
-t')(Ji'. Thus the ratio of the tax—to non—
tax—deferred yields is [(1 —t)/(1—tl)]ert(j
—'•[i—P(J)].If t =
made.One might also suppose that the larger the liquid asset balances, the
easier it would be to forego liquidity and to putmoney in an IRA.-34--
and j >59),it is simply ert(j ').Thusbecause of the tax free
compounding of interest in IRA accounts, as well as the possible difference
between pre- and post-retirement tax rates, persons in higher marginal tax
brackets should have a greater incentive to save through IRAs.26
The penalty for early withdrawal makes the IRA less liquid and thus
may detract from the desirability of IRAs, however.27 But the liquidity
consideration should be less important for people with higher marginal tax
rates. Taking account of the penalty for early withdrawal, the tabulation
below shows the number of years that funds must be left in an IRA account for
the return to exceed the non-tax-deferred return.
26jisalso informative to consider the cost, in terms of current consumption,
of providing retirement income. Suppose, thinking in a manner roughly
consistent with statements of some pension planners, an individual wants to
accumulate a given retirement fund by age j >59i.If the amount accumulated





—t')(J—3').The amount of required
S2 relative to S1 would be S2/S1 =[(1-t)/(1-tI)Jert
(3 Thecost
in terms of current consumption is given by (S21S1) =[C2/C1(1
-t')l,where C
represents current consumption cost. Thus
C2/C1 =[1-t)/(1-tt)2jert
-i').If t =t',
C2/C1 =[11(1—tfler(- . Thisis of course another way of
emphasizing the IRA advantage. But it also suggests that the income effect
created by the lower IRA cost could in theory lead to greater consumption,
although the parameter estimates themselves, together with the simulations
presented below, are inconsistent with this conceptual possibility.
27We say may because one of us finds the non-liquid aspect of the IRA a positive
attribute. So much for "rationalt' behavior.—35—
Marginal Tax Rate
Interest Rate 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
2% 60.0 34.0 26.1 23.2 22.6
6% 20.8 11.7 9.0 8.0 7.8
10% 12.9 7.3 5.6 4.9 4.8
14% 9.5 5.4 4.1 3.6 3.5
18% 7.7 4.3 3.3 2.9 2.8
Thus it is clear that both the interest rate arid the marginal tax rate should
have a substantial effect on the desirability of IRAs to the extent that
short-term liquidity is an important consideration.
We are, however, unable to demonstrate convincingly an increasing
preference for IRAs with increasing marginal tax rates. The coefficient on
the marginal tax rate is significant in both b1 and b2 when it is entered as a
determinant of the b's. Indeed -its estimated effect -is somewhat larger in
b2.
(See appendix table 6.) Results with a and 3 parameterized show that the
marginal tax rate -is positively related to total saving, 13, but is negatively
related to the proportion allocated to IRAs, a. These results seem to suggest
that the marginal tax rate is picking up an individual-specific saving effect,
but seems not related to a particular preference for IRAs. Wise (1984] was
unable to identify an effect of the marginal tax rate on tax-deferred saving
in Canada, using precisely measured marginal tax rates, as opposed to the
self-reported rates used here.28 While the marginal tax rate enters our budget
28Wise [1984] contains analysis of Canadian tax-deferred Registered Retirement
Saving Plans. In general, we have found that the estimated effect of the
marginal tax rate is very sensitive to functional form. See also Wise [1985]
and Venti and Wise [1985a]. King and Leape (1984] also mention the difficulty
of isolating the effect of the marginal tax rate and they conclude:-36--
constraintas the cost of S1, the functional form virtually assures a positive
relationship between the tax rate and IRA saving. We do not estimate a price
parameter directly. Rather the price enters as a transformation to the data.
Indeed the likelihood function is somewhat higher if P1 is set to one for
everyone, although the effect on the simulations reported below is not
substantial.
Thus, while difficult to demonstrate, we believe that the widespread
promotion of IRA accounts may be the most important reason for increased
saving through their use.
In addition, the estimates do not suggest more IRA saving among persons
without than with private pension plans, one of the primary goals of IRA
legislation. The coefficient on the pension variable (—.0140) is not
significantly different from zero. Furthermore, persons with private pensions
save more in the S2 form. Results based on the parameterization of a and
suggest that while persons without private plans save less, they devote a
larger proportion of what they do save to IRAs.
The apparent variation in saving behavior among occupations or other
segments of the population has been mentioned by others.29 The strong rela-
tionship of education to IRA saving -is consistent with such variation. In its
relation to b1, a year of education is equivalent to more than two years in
age and more than $30,000 in liquid wealth. The amount of the marginal dollar
devoted to IRAs increases with age but decreases with income.
contrary to much of the recent literature, that taxes do not play a
decisive role in explaining the difference in portfolio composition across
households.
29See, for example, the survey by King [19851.-37-
b. Variants of the Base Specification
A potentially important restriction in the base specification is that
the error variances ofa1 and a2 are equal. While this restriction is not
necessary in principle, under the assumption that S =2only the functional
form and the limit L allow identification of the variance ofa2. Under the
assumption that S =
S1+S2.direct evidence on the residual variance ofS2 is
provided. Estimates based on the assumption that "savings andreserve funds"
S include IRAs and allowing separate estimates ofa1 and a2 are presented in
appendix table 2. Both variances are estimated rather precisely and are close
in magnitude (a1 =8.84,a2 =5.45).Comparison with estimates in appendix
table 3 that restricta1 to equal a2 shows that the two are not significantly
different by a likelihood ratio test. The other findings discussedabove are
not qualitatively affected if it is assumed that S =
S1
+S2.except that the
residual correlation is now not significantly different from zero.3°
Estimates like those in appendix table 2, but using total wealth
only, instead of liquid versus non—liquid wealth, show that total wealth is
in fact negatively related to totalS1 and 2 saving and is unrelated to the
proportion allocated to S, as mentioned above. (See appendix table 4.)
Estimates comparable to appendix table 2, but withP1 =1for all persons
(ignoring the marginal tax effect) are presented in appendix table 5. The
likelihood value indeed increases, but as shown below, conclusions about the
effect of IRA limit changes are not appreciably altered. Estimates with
301t can be shown that if S =
S2but it is assumed that S =
S1
+S2.the
estimated variance of S2 will be biased downward. In addition, the estimated
residual correlation between S1 and S2 will be biased downward.-38-
additive disturbances, instead of random a1 and a2, are shown in appendix
table 7. The estimates are very close to those in text table 7 discussed
above.
2. More Flexible Substitution, a and f3 Parameterized
a. Withk=0
Estimates with k =0are shown in table 8. They are comparable to
those -in table 7, except that a andinstead of b1 and b2, are parameterized,
and additive disturbances instead of random a1 and a2, are used. (Appendix
table 7 shows results with b1 and b2 parameterized and using additive
disturbances.) Only estimates assuming S =S2are presented with the more
flexible model.31 The basic conclusions are the same as those based on table
7. The mean is .244 versus .247 in table 7; the mean ô2, .049, is
somewhat smaller than its table 7 counterpart, .102, however.
This parameterization, however, indicates total S1 +S2saving out of
marginal income by f3, and the share of the total to S1 by a. Some of the
conclusions have been discussed above. In addition, the estimates indicate
that while total saving increases with age, the proportion allocated to IRAs
does not. The more educated save more but allocate a smaller proportion to
IRAs, according to these results. Thus it is apparently their greater
propensity to save rather than a greater preference for tax—deferred saving
that leads to more IRA saving among the educated. As mentioned above, while
persons without private pension plans save less, these results indicate that
they devote a larger proportion of saving to IRAs. Thus it is apparently
31Results with S =
S1
+
S2are presented in Venti and Wise [1985b].—39-






































Determinants ofand a: a
Income ($1000's) -.0060(.0011) -.0048(.0028)
Age (years) .0137(.0024) .0004(.0701)
Wealth: Non—Liquid ($1000's)—.00055(.00010) .0014(.0007)
Liquid ($1000's) .01438(.00185) -.0164(.0020)
Private Pension (0,1) .1605(.0148) -1.4510(.3500)
Education (years) .0361(.0088) -.0465(.0075)
Unmarried woman (0,1) .0649(.0925) .0246(.1348)





















































































their lower propensity to save, rather than the same IRA preferenceas that of
private pension holders, that leads to comparable desired IRA contributions
among those with and without private pensions.
b. With k =.65
Estimates with k set at .65 are shown in table 9. The individual
parameter estimates are very close to those with k =0,with the exception of
the constant terms in a and .Again,differences are summarized in the
61 and 62 measures. The mean is .213 when k =.65and .244 with k =0.
The mean 62 estimates are .028 and .049 respectively.
The effect of a change in the IRA limit depends in large part on the
difference between the share of marginal income allocated toS2 by people who
are not constrained by the limit and the share allocated to2 by those who
are constrained by the limit. These shares are denoted byö2 and
respectively. Their means for k =0and k =.65are as follows:
6*
2
k =0 .091 .117
k =.65 .046 .096
Thus the predicted relative shift to S2 when the constraint is reached is
greater when the data are assumed to have been generated by individual saving
behavior with greater substitution betweenS1 and S2. This is reflected in
greater reduction in S2 for the k.65 model when the IRA limit is raised
than for the k =0model, as indicated in the simulations below.-42-
C.The Model Fit
Although there is some variation in the model fit by specification.
the differences are quite small. Thus we present comparison of predicted
versus actual values for three illustrative cases. Based on the k =0model,
with a and 13 parameterized, table 10 shows simulated versus actual values of
the proportion of respondents with S1 >0,S1 >L,and S >0,by income
interval. Possibly most important are the proportions with S >0conditional
on S1 =L(at the IRA limit) and with S >0conditional on S1 <0(no IRA).
Overall the fit is very close. In particular, the model seems not to
underestimate the S2 saving of persons who are at the IRA limit, as might be
expected if not enough substitution of S2 for S were allowed by the model
when the S1 limit is reached. But this simulation shows some over-prediction
of 2 saving for persons below the IRA limit. The simulated predictions are
based on only 10 draws per person, however, so they reflect some random
variation.32 While unconditional overall proportions will match the actual
values closely, nothing in the specifications assures a close fit by income
interval. The model over-predicts saving of low-income persons. This is a
characteristic of all of the specifications.
This over-prediction is eliminated if the disturbance terms are




+e2.33The fit based on this model with
321n eight different simulations with 10 draws per person in each the average of
the predicted proportion of those with S >0given S1 =Lwas .676.
335-imilar results were obtained by Wise [1984, 1985] using Canadian data and by
Venti and Wise [1985a] using Current Population Survey data.-43-










P A P A
.07 .03 .04 .02
.11 .07 .06 .02
.19 .25 .10 .13
.30 .32 .18 .21
.46 .52 .30 .35
.65 .58 .48 .46
.39 .60 .36 .50
.22 .22 .13 .14
%S>0
given s1 =L given
N pC Ad N
7 .48 .33 162
17 .56 .43 288
25 .66 .70 235
30 .66 .75 140
23 .66 .63 54
37 .77 .74 40
4 .94 .60 6
143 .68 .69 833
a. Based on 10 draws per sample observation.
b. V -T,in thousands of dollars.
c. Predicted S >0,given predicted s1 =L.
d. Observed in the sample.
























































Table 11. Simulated predicted vs actual values, by income interval, k =0,















P A P A
.03 .03 .01 .02
.08 .07 .03 .02
.21 .25 .10 .13
.33 .32 .20 .21
.48 .52 .33 .35
.56 .58 .48 .46
.58 .60 .54 .50
.21 .22 .13 .14
%S>0
given s1 =L given
N pC Ad N
3 .30 .33 164
7 .69 .43 285
33 .69 .70 196
36 .66 .75 115
27 .70 .63 37
35 .71 .74 32
5 .72 .60 4
146 .69 .69 833
a.Based on 10 draws per sample observation.
b. V -T,in thousands of dollars.
c. Predicted S >0,given predicted S1 =L.
d. Observed in the sample.


















































Table 12. Simulated predicted vs actual values, by income interval, k=•65,a
S>0 Income
Intervalb Number P A P A P A
0 -10 169 .08 .03 .04 .02 .40 .31
10 20 305 .11 .07 .06 .02 .44 .38
20 —30 260 .20 .25 .12 .13 .45 .47
30 -40 170 .28 .32 .15 .21 .48 .56
40 -50 77 .44 .52 .31 .35 .52 .55
50 -100 77 .63 .58 .48 .46 .61 .69
100 + 10 .38 .60 .33 .50 .77 .70
Total 1068 .22 .22 .14 .14 .46 .46
S>0 S>0
given s1 =L given S1 =0
N pC Ad N pe Ad
0 -10 8 .52 .33 162 .40 .32
10 —20 19 .68 .43 286 .42 .37
20 -30 30 .63 .70 230 .43 .43
30 —40 26 .61 .75 144 .45 .49
40 -50 24 .64 .63 54 .47 .46
50 -100 37 .72 .74 40 .51 .60
100 + 3 .94 .60 7 .69 .75
Total 146 .66 .69 835 .42 .40
a. Based on 10 draws per sample observation.
b. Y -T,in thousands of dollars.
c. Predicted S >0,given predicted S1 =L.
d. Observed in the sample.
e. Predicted S >0,given predicted S1 <0.46-
k=0is shown in table 11, where it can be seen that the predicted and actual
proportions are very close for all income groups. Finally, illustrative
predictions with k =.65are shown in table 12. The predicted versus actual
values are very similar to those in the k =0case, although if anything the
predicted proportion of those at the limit with S >0is somewhat lower than
in the k =0case.34 Predictions with b1 and b2 parameter-ized are shown in
appendix table 8, based on the estimates in table 7. This specification
tends to predict a lower portion of those at the limit with S >0than the
model with a and /3 parameterized.
D. Simulations of the Effect of IRA Limit Changes
To estimate the effect of IRAs on saving, we have predicted the
effect of limit changes on IRA contributions and on other saving. To add
content to this exercise, we have simulated the effects of several recently
proposed limit changes. The first we call the Treasury Plan.35 It would
increase the limit for an employed person from $2000 to $2500, and would
increase the limit for a nonworking spouse from $250 to $2500. Thus, for
example, the contribution limit for a husband and nonworking wife would
increase from $2250 to $5000. A Modified Treasury Plan increases the limit
for an employed person from $2000 to $2500, but only increases the limit for
a nonworking spouse to $500, from $250. Finally, the President's Plan would
341he average over eight simulations with 10 draws per person -in each was .656,
versus .676 in the k =0case. The average over three simulations with 50
draws per person in each was .652.
35See U.S. Department of Treasury [1984].-47-
leave the limit for an employed person at $2000, but would raise the limit
for a nonworking spouse from $250 to $2OO0. For comparison, simulated
savings under the current limit are also shown.
The predicted changes should be interpreted as indications of
changes in saving had the IRA limit been higher in 1982.It is important to
keep in mind that S2 saving undoubtedly excludes changes in non-liquid wealth
such as housing. The possible substitution between IRAs and housing wealth
in the long run, for example, would not be reflected in these estimates.
They are intended, however, to indicate the extent to which IRA
contributions in 1982 were simply a substitute for other forms of saving,
other than non-liquid assets. The top portion of the table pertains to
individuals who are predicted to be at the IRA limit, since it is only this
group that would be affected by an increase in the limit. The bottom
portion shows simulated contributions by family type. The simulations are
based on the estimation sample. Those in table 13 are based on the estimates
in table 7 and those in table 14 on the k =.65estimates shown in table 9.
The simulated values are based on 10 random draws for each observation in the
estimation sample.
The predicted changes in S1 and S2 under the treasury plan for fami-
lies at the IRA limit, for example, are as follows:
36See U.S. President [1985].-48-
AS1 AS2
Base model +1138 -94
k =.65 +1091 —210
These values suggest that only ten to twenty percent of the IRA increase is
offset by a reduction in other financial assets. Thus at least in the short
run, tax—deferred IRA accounts have by these estimates led to a relatively
large increase in total individual saving (as defined in this paper).
Possibly the best indicator of saving is change in consumption. The
average change in "consumption" (as defined implicitly in this paper) under
each plan is shown -in table 16 together with changes in S2 and in taxes. For
example, the simulated changes under the Treasury Plan for families at the
limit are:
Base Model k =.65Model
Amount Percent Amount Percent
IRA, S1 Saving +1138 100.0 +1091 100.0
2 Saving
-94 -8.3 -210 —19.2
Consumption -643 -56.5 -493 -45.2
Taxes -401 —35.2 -388 -35.6
Thus possibly fifty percent of the IRA increase is funded by a reduction in
consumption, according to these measures, and possibly thirty-five percent by
reduced taxes, with a relatively small proportion coming from reduction in
other saving.-49-
Table 13. Simulated increases in IRA contributions and in other saving, by
plan and family type, table 7 parameter estimates, b1 and b2


















Base Change Change Change
Observations Predicted at the Limit
All families
Ave. contribution 30253148 1138 -94 743 —65 396 -29
change ------ +38 -3 4-25 -2 •i-13 -1
All Observations
All families
Ave. contribution519-811 142 -12 93 -8 49 -3
change +27 -1 4-18 -1 +9 0
Unmarried head
Ave. contribution270-749 50 —6 50 -6 0 0
change +i -1 +19 -1 o o
Married,
one earner
Ave. contribution350 -1643 279 -21 89 —7 191 —14
change +80 -1 +25 0 ÷55 -1
Married,
two earners
Ave. contribution797—355 127 —11 127 —1]. 0 0
change +16 -3 +16 -3 0 0-50-
Table 14. Simulated increases in IRA contributions and in other saving, by
plan and family type, using table 9 parameter estimates, a and


















Base Change Change Change
Observations Predicted at the Limit
All families
Ave. contribution 30693831 1091—210 754 —143 351 —67
9 change -—- +36 -5 +25 -4 +11 -2
All Observations
All families
Ave. contribution522 111 143 —28 99 —19 46 —9
change --- -—- +27 —26 +19 -17 +9 —8
Unmarried head
Ave. contribution265-471 51 —10 51 -10 0 0
change +19 -2 +19 -2 0 0
Married,
one earner
Ave. contribution346 14 255 —49 85 -15 177
change --- +74 +25 +51
Married,
two earners
Ave. contribution811 583 141 -27 141 -27 0 0
change --- +17 -5 +17 -5 0 0—51—







AS1 saving 1138 (100.0) 743 (100.0) 396(100.0)
AS2 saving —94 (8.3) -65 (8.7) -29 (7.3)
A Consumption -643 (56.5) -421 (56.7) -228 (57.6)
A Taxes -401 (35.2) —257 (34.6) 139 (35.1)
All Families
AS1 saving 142 (100.0) 93 (100.0) 49 (100.0)
AS2 saving -12 (8.5) -8 (8.6) —3 (6.1)
A Consumption -81 (57.0) -53 (57.0) -29 (59.2)




AS1 saving 1091 (100.0) 754(100.0) 351 (100.0)
AS2 saving -210 (19.2) —143 (19.0) —67 (19.1)
A Consumption -493 (45.2) -344 (45.6) -162 (46.2)
A Taxes —388 (35.6) —267 (35.4) —122 (34.8)
All Families
AS1 saving 143 (100.0) 99 (100.0) 46 (100.0)
AS2 saving —28 (19.6) -19 (19.2) —9 (19.6)
A Consumption -65 (45.5) -45 (45.5) -21 (45.7)
A Taxes —50 (35.0) -35 (35.4) -16 (34.8)-52-
The estimated IRA increases can be compared with estimates by Venti
and Wise (1985a] based on 1983 Current Population Survey (CPS) data. The CPS
data reported actual 1982 IRA contributions by interval, while 1982
contributions had to be inferred from balances reported in the SCF. In
addition, self-reported marginal tax rates were used here, while estimated
rates were used in conjunction with the CPS data. Nonetheless the simulated
effects of limit increases are virtually the same. For example, for all
families the simulated increase under the Treasury Plan is twenty-seven
percent versus thirty percent based on the CPS data. The increase for
unmarried heads is nineteen percent versus nineteen percent based on the CPS;
-it is eighty percent versus seventy—nine percent for married one-earner
families; and sixteen percent versus sixteen percent for married two-earner
families.
E. Sensitivity of Results to Model Specification
The sensitivity of the results to selected specification changes is
shown in table 16. Possibly the best summary indicator of the effect of
these changes is the simulated change in S2 under the Treasury Plan. In
each case, the decline in 2 is small relative to the increase in IRAs,
although the magnitude of the decline in S2 varies by a factor of four.None
of the specification changes has much effect on the simulated IRA change.
Assuming that S =S
+
S2tends to reduce the estimated reduction in S,
except where P1 is set to 1.In the latter case, the constrained estimate
of ö2is larger because b2/(l. - islarger.
IV. Conclusions
Increasing the IRA limits would lead to substantial increases in tax-—53—
Table16. Sensitivity of simulations to alternative specifications
Treasury Plan Effect for




b1, b2 parameterized -1380 .247 .102 1138 -94
b1, b2 parameterized; —1399 .268 .103 1135 -95
stocks & bonds included
with liquid assets
b1, b2 parameter-ized; —1377 .240 .078 1144 -83
additive errors
k0; a, parameterized; -1379 .244 .049 1111 -69
additive errors
k =.65;a, parameterized; -1394 .213 .028 1091 -210
additive errors
S =
S1+ S2; b1, b2 parameterized:
f02 —1377 .287 .059 1137 —52
01 =02 —1378 .254 .085 1141 -76
Total wealth only -1381 .294 .061 1143 -45
P1 =1 —1363 .403 .096 1130 -172—54-
deferred saving according to our evidence, based on the 1983 Survey of Con—
sumer Finances. For example, the recent Treasury Plan would increase IRA
contributions by about thirty percent. Virtually the same estimate was
obtained in previous analysis based on Current Population Survey data,
suggesting that this conclusion may be relatively robust. The primary focus
of this paper, however, has been the effect of limit increases on other
saving. how much of the IRA increase would be offset by reduction in non-tax-
deferred saving? The weight of our evidence suggests that very little of the
increase would be offset by reduction -in other financial assets, possibly ten
to twenty percent, maybe less. Our estimates suggest that forty-
five to fifty-five percent of the IRA increase would be funded by reduction in
consumption, and about thirty-five percent by reduced taxes.
The analysis rests on a preference structure recognizing the
constraint that the IRA limit places on the allocation of current income. The
model fits the data well and in particular distinguishes accurately the
savings decisions of persons at the IRA limit versus those who are not.
The greatest potential uncertainty about the results and the greatest
statistical complication for analysis stems from the limited information on
non-IRA saving and thus the difficulty of obtaining direct estimates of the
degree of substitution between tax-deferred and non-tax-deferred saving. We
have addressed these issues by considering the sensitivity of our conclusions
to specification changes, including assumptions about the interpretation of
key variables and the extent of substitution underlying observed saving
outcomes. Although the magnitude of the estimated reduction in other saving,
with increases in the IRA limit, is sensitive to specification changes, the—55—
reduction as a percent of the IRA increase is invariably small.
In addition to these primary conclusions, our evidencesuggests
substantial variation in saving behavior among segments of the population. We
also find that IRAs do not serve as a substitute for private pensionplans,
although persons without private plans devote a larger proportion of their lower
total saving to IRAs. Thus the legislative goal of disproportionatelyincreasing
retirement saving among persons without pension plans is apparently notbeing
realized. But the more general goal of increasing individual saving is.-56—
Appendix A: Imputing 1982 IRA Contributions
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) asked respondents if they had
any IRA accounts and the total dollar value in all of them. The SCF did not
ask respondents for their 1982 contribution. Given that ERTA liberalized
eligibility beginning in 1982 (nearly 3/4 of all 1982 accounts were opened in
1982),, the following criteria are used to impute 1982 contributions:
(a) If the total value of IRAs is less than the 1982 family limit
then the total value is assumed to be the 1982 contribution.
(b) If the total value of IRAs exceeds the 1982 family limit then
the family limit is assumed to be the 1982 contribution.
Imputed IRA contributions based on this procedure compare favorably to
evidence from the CPS, which presents 1982 contributions by interval.—57-
AppendixTable 1: Summary statistics for estimation subsample
Variable All
I ContributorsOnly
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Total After-tax
a
Income (V -1) 26239 22442 41093 30354
Age 37.7 11.4 44.0 11.2
b
Wealth 59781 115927 120628 169900
Liquid wealth 7796 19109 17974 30156
Non—liquid wealth 51984 109231 102654 160011
c
Private pension (0,1) 0.67 0.47 0.80 0.40
Education (years) 13.4 2.5 14.5 2.3
Unmarried woman (0,1) 0.17 0.38 0.10 0.30
Unmarried man (0,1) 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.31
Marginal tax rate 0.25 0.15 0.31 0.14
IRA ($) 533 1154 2423 1257
IRA >0(0,1) 0.22 0.41 -
"S"(0,1) 0.46 0.50 0.65 0.48
N of observations 1068 235
a. Total after—tax income is obtained by using the reported marginal tax
rate and inferred filing status to calculate (using 1982 tax tables) the
taxes paid by each family, and subtracting this amount from total income.
b. The wealth variables are defined in footnote 4.
c. For two worker families the variable is unity if either member
participates in a pension plan, and zero otherwise.-58-
AppendixTable 2. Parameter estimates with b1 and b2 parameterized,
assuming that S =S1+2'a1 :j a2.






Correlation of a1, a2
S.D. of S1 (at mean)
S.D. of 2 (at mean)
Correlation of S1. 2



















































































Appendix Table 3. Parameter estimates with b1 and b2 parameterized,
assuming that S =S1
+S2.a1 =a2.
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Appendix Table 4.Parameter estimates with b1 and b2 parameterized,
assuming that S =S1
+S2,a1 j a2, using total wealth.
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Appendix Table 5. Parameter estimates with b1 and b2 parameterized,
assuming that S =S1+S2.a1a2, and P1 =1.
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Appendix Table 6. Parameter estimates with b1 and b2 parameterized, assuming
S =S1+S2,a 102,P1 =1,and marginal tax rate in
b1 and b2.
Variable Estimate (Asymptotic Standard Error)
Origin Parameters:
Mean of a1 (7.59)
Mean of a2 (3.45)
S.D. of a1 (3.13)
S.D. of a2 (4.16)
Correlation of a1, a2 (.20)
S.D. of S1 (at mean)
S.D. of S2 (at mean)
Correlation of S1, S2


















Predicted and 82: ________
Mean .412 .118













.0076 (.0016) -.0051 (.0032)
-.000112(.000080) -.000163(.00041)
.00241(.00049) .00777(.00274)
—.0469 (.0315) .3478 (.1426)
.0198(.0064) .0051 (.0151)
.0555 (.0429) .1006 (.1012)
.0385 (.0362) .2246(.0844)
.3000 (.1023) .4884 (.2556)
-.6464 (.2403) -1.3149 (.4281)
b11 b2
61
LF -1358Parameter estimates with b1 and b2 parameterized,
S =S2.additive disturbance
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Mean .240 .078



























Appendix Table 8. Simulated predicted vs actual values, by income interval,
b1 and b2 parameterized.a
Income 5i>0 s1=L S>0
Intervaib Number P A P A P A
0 -10 169 .07 .03 .04 .02 .34 .31
10 -20 305 .11 .07 .06 .02 .41 .38
20 -30 260 .19 .25 .10 .13 .47 .47
30 -40 170 .31 .32 .18 .21 .53 .56
40 50 77 .45 .52 .28 .35 .56 .55
50 —100 77 .63 .58 .44 .46 .61 .69
100 + 10 .70 .60 .56 .50 .60 .70
Total 1068 .22 .22 .13 .14 .46 .46
S>0 S>0
given s1 =L given s1 =0
N pC Ad N pe Ad
0 -10 7 .39 .33 162 .34 .32
10 —20 17 .59 .43 288 .40 .37
20 —30 26 .56 .70 235 .46 .43
30 -40 36 .67 .75 139 .49 .49
40 —50 21 .66 .63 56 .52 .46
50 —100 34 .69 .74 43 .54 .59
100 + 6 .75 .60 4 .41 .75
Total 141 .63 .69 830 .41 .40
a.Based on 10 draws per sample observation, and on the parameter
estimates in text table 7.
b. V -T,in thousands of dollars.
c. Predicted S >0,given predicted S1 =L.
d. Observed in the sample.
e. Predicted S >0,given predicted S1 <0.—65—
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